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Aristotle on Responsibility for One's Character
and the Possibility of Character Change
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WILLIAM BONDESON 
ristotle's discussion of the voluntary and the involuntary occurs
in
Book III, chapters 1 through 5, of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
He is concerned to assess the conditions under which a) an action 
and b) a state of character can be called voluntary or involuntary. And
he wants to make the important point that only voluntary. actions
and voluntarily acquired states of character are praiseworthy or
blameworthy and that men can be held responsible only for these
kinds of actions and states of character. In this discussion I am only
concerned with Aristotle's views concerning one of the conditions
under which men can be held responsible for their states of character 
although this has implications for his analysis of the nature of human 
action and the relation of knowledge to the virtues. 
If, under some conditions at least, men can be held responsible for
their states of character, some related questions arise. Is it possible to
act contrary to an established state of character? Is it possible to form
contrary states. of character by performing actions contrary to an 
established state of character? Is, for example, the habitual coward 
doomed to live out his state of character or is moral reform possible?
In the opening lines of Book II, Aristotle implies that character 
change is possible. Moral virtue arises in men, unlike intellectual 
virtue, by habituation and thus 
"it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arise in us by
nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit 
contrary to its nature." (1103 a 19-20, Ross trans.)
He goes on to point out that stones cannot be habituated to fall up-
wards nor can fire be habituated to move downwards. He is implying
that those states of character which are the moral virtues are not 
naturally acquired and by the (assumed) principle that things in men 
which do not exist or arise by nature are changeable, he maintains 
that men indeed can act contrary to their states of character. By
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implication, it should be possible for men to build new states of char-
acter. In the Categories Aristotle clearly states that character change
can occur: ,
"The bad man, if he is being brought into a better way of life and
thought, may make some advance, however slight, and if he 
should once improve, even ever so little, it is plain that he might
change completely, or at any rate make very great progress;
for a man becomes more and more easily moved to virtue, how-
ever small the improvement was at first. It is, therefore, natural
to suppose that he will make yet greater progress than he has 
made in the past; and as this process goes on, it will change him
completely and establish in him a contrary state, provided he is 
not hindered by lack of time." (13 a 23 -13 a 31, Rosstrans.)
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However, in Book III, chapter 5 of the Ethics, Aristotle makes a 
point which would seem to contradict this altogether. Aristotle says:
"We may suppose a case in which (a man) is ill voluntarily
through living incontinently and disobeying his doctors. In that
case it was then open to him not to be ill, but not now, when
he has thrown away his chance, just as when you let a stone go,
it is too late to recover it; but yet it was in your power to throw 
it, since the moving principle was in you. So, too, to the unjust
and to the self-indulgent man it was open at the beginning not
to become men of this kind, and so they are unjust and self- 
indulgent voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is 
not possible for them not to be so." (111.4 a 15-22, Ross trans.)
In a very perceptive interpretation of Aristotle's views,3 F. A. Siegler
has discussed this passage. Siegler argues that the stone analogy is
misleading4 and he cites 1103 a 19-20 which I have pointed out above. 
By any interpretation of this earlier passage it would be unlikely
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that Aristotle would maintain that every state of character is like a 
stone once it is thrown although it is an open question as to what 
would count as a changeable state of character and also whether
there are some states of character (how are these to be identified?)
for which change is impossible. The passage in which states of character 
are like thrown stones (1114 a 15-22) Siegler shows to be a special
case and not contrary to Aristotle's view in the earlier passage.
Siegler says, 
"In this passage Aristotle is concerned only with acts done in 
ignorance due to carelessness (vide the preceding passage 1114 a 1- 
1114 a 3.) Unlike a greedy man whose greedy acts-in character-
are themselves voluntary, the careless man acts in ignorance and
therefore involuntarily. But, nevertheless, just as with other 
character traits, a careless man has become so voluntarily,
knowing what kind of person he risks becoming... Thus the careless 
man who acts in ignorance of a particular does not act voluntarily,
but he is to blame for the harm he causes since his act i, the result
of his bad character for which he is to blame."5 (my italics)
I should like to argue that Siegler and, as far as I can discover, all of 
Aristotle's commentators have failed to notice an additional point
which appears to be crucial to understanding Aristotle's account of 
both how men can be held responsible for their states of character 
and how character change is possible. That point is hinted at by Siegler
in that portion of the quote above which I have underlined, but the 
point is made very clearly by Aristotle:
"Now not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on
particular objects that states of character are produced is the 
mark of a thoroughly senseless person."
(1114 a 9 - 1114 a 11 Ross trans.)6
s
Fundamental to the understanding of this passage is the meaning of
the term &vocLcr,s,1J'rOC:;.According to the Bonitz lexicon, Aristotle fre-
quently uses the term to mean a failure of or lack of some sensory
organ. Clearly this cannot be the way he uses the term here. He also
uses the term to mean the inability to feel pleasure, and this cannot 
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be the meaning of the term here either.' Rather than these meanings,
Bonitz cites this passage and three other passages in which the term
means the opposite of And this meaning fits the context ol
the passage under discussion. Thus the term probably means not
being a sensible person, not having good sense, or not having common
sense. And the addition of zo?tL8? makes it plausible to render the 
phrase as Ross does.
This item of knowledge, Aristotle seems to be saying, is widely
shared. Only the however large their number might be,
are unaware of this apparently basic truth. But in what ways are men
aware of this and what is the status of this item of knowledge in
Aristotle's moral psychology? The sentences immediately preceding
the passage in question make it clear that the item of knowledge at
least is exhibited in practice:
" ... for it is activities exercised on particular objects that make
the corresponding character. This is plain from the case of people
training for any contest or action; they practise the activity
the whole time." (1114 a 6 -1114 a 9, Ross trans.)
Since Aristotle is here talking about training for athletic activities,
he must want to say that a principle which applies to physical skills
must have an analogue in the case of moral activities.9 But if the
actions that men perform lead to the establishment of states of 
character (and conversely that states of character lead to the per-
formance of corresponding kinds of actions) then, Aristotle is arguing,
this knowledge plays an important role in establishing states of char-
acter and also in changing them. However, young children apparently
63
do not have this knowledge, yet they can have and acquire states
of character. Thus it is not likely that Aristotle is saying that having
this knowledge is a necessary condition for establishing a state of 
character. One might not need to know that performing a particular
action will produce a corresponding state of character in order for 
that action to produce that state of character. Aristotle might be
saying, although the text is not at all clear on this, that having this
knowledge is what makes states of character morally appraisable. 
Several questions can be raised about this item of knowledge:
1) How is it known?
2) Who knows it and how is the man ignorant of this knowledge to
be characterized?
3) How is this item of knowledge related to the claim that men,
at least in some cases, can be held responsible for their states of 
character?
4) How is this item of knowledge related to the claim that, at least
in some cases, character change or moral reform is possible?
5) Could a man ignorant of this item of knowledge be held responsible
for his states of character and could he change his character? 
Question 1) can be answered rather clearly from Aristotle's text.
At the minimum the example of athletic training shows that some 
men make use of the item of knowledge in one area of human activity.
But, in the main passage under discussion here Aristotle claims that 
only the is ignorant of the item of knowledge
stated in its most general form. Thus Aristotle seems to want to claim
that not only is the item of knowledge exhibited in practice but also
that only the X.OfL?Ö1í do not actually and consciously know
it. But how is this known? I cannot find any direct answer to this 
question in the text but I would suggest that this item could well 
fall within the class of those widely held views of men about 
moral and other matters, which Aristotle often uses in his philosophi-
zing.1° The first chapter of the first book of the Ethics contains many
of these, for example the views about the final end of human activity
and the nature of happiness. But a difference must be pointed out.
The about what happiness consists in (i.e. that it is pleasure,
honor or wealth) are not correct in and of themselves; they must be 
subjected to a dialectical analysis after which they turn out to be 
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partly correct and partly incorrect. The item of knowledge concerning
actions and states of character cannot be like this; Aristotle nowhere
qualifies it or analyzes it any further. Rather it must be something
which is known and which is correct as it stands. Thus it must have
the status of a self-evident item of common sense for most men and in 
Aristotle's moral psychology it must have the status of a self-evident
first principle. (Philosophically, a more broadly based defence of the
item of knowledge could be made using Aristotle's doctrines of poten-
tiality and actuality.)
Question 2) concerns the distribution of the item of knowledge
among men and it, too, is answered by interpreting the phrase xo?,c8?p
As I have pointed out above, the translation of Ross,
"thoroughly senseless," well fits the context. If this is correct and if,
as I tried to show in answering question 1), the item of knowledge
must be known by most men as a dictum of common sense, then the 
majority of men must have this knowledge and it is likely that
Aristotle might even make the strong claim that most men know this.
To put the matter the other way around, the men who are ignorant
of this are beyond the bounds of sense and are probably so deficient 
that they cannot be counted as moral agents. Since Aristotle clearly
wants to count most men as moral agents, then most men must know
and be able to use this item of knowledge.ll
Questions 3), 4) and 5) can be answered together. If men do know 
that actions of certain kinds lead to corresponding states of character,
then that knowledge makes them responsible for the states of character 
which they have acquired. But this is possible only if it is possible
to act contrary to an established character. 12 One could imagine a
case in which a man knew that the actions he performs will lead to a
corresponding state of character but nevertheless he is unable to act 
contrary to his existing state of character. The quote from the Cave- 
goyies (13 a 23 - 13 a 31) which I have given above makes it clear that 
Aristotle believes that actions contrary to states of character are 
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indeed possible.13 Thus Aristotle must believe that there are cases
in which a man could change an established state of character. Since
this kind of action is possible and since men must know that this
kind of action is possible, it follows that men can be held responsible
for the states of character which they have. Thus the notions of 
responsibility for states of character, the possibility of acting contrary 
to an established state of character and acquiring contrary states of
character are intimately related to one another in the sense that if one 
of these is possible then they all are. And all three of these are possible
only on the grounds that men actually know and use the item of 
knowledge that certain kinds of actions lead to the establishment of 
certain kinds of states of character. If these considerations are correct 
then a man ignorant of the item of knowledge can not be held respon-
sible for his states of character although he might be changed due to 
outside influences. 
Left unanswered in this discussion, because there does not seem 
to be adequate evidence in the text, is the basic question as to whether 
every state of character is changeable or whether some states of
character are entirely unchangeable. That some states of character 
are changeable is clear but there is no explicit statement in the text 
that all states of character are changeable nor does Aristotle give
any criteria for distinguishing between changeable and non-changeable
states of character. Also left unanswered are questions as to the 
relations between the item of knowledge and the problems of the
weakness of the will, the practical syllogism and the nature of practical
wisdom.
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